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changes. Laboratory methods for analyzing general market behavior have matured and are now a widely accepted empirical technique (Smith (1982) , Plott (1982) ). In the last decade, there have been dozens of asset market studies in the laboratory; see Sunder (1992) for a survey.
The experimental approach offers several important advantages for studying the market impact and profitability of trading privileges. To begin with, one works with humans who have the means (and motive and opportunity) to adapt their behavior to privileges and other market rules. The measurement problems virtually disappear because the experimenter can observe (or even control) traders' private information and, therefore, can directly measure market efficiency and traders' profits. Moreover, the experimenter can systematically vary the market rules and trading privileges and, therefore, make valid causal inferences about their impact.
An important caveat is in order. Research budgets limit the scale of laboratory markets. One's first impulse in designing a laboratory market environment often is to replicate a field setting (e.g., the NYSE) as closely as the budget permits.
Experimentalists have learned to resist this impulse because it usually leads to effective loss of experimental control. They have learned patiently to introduce only a few novel features at a time into the laboratory environment, because only then can they confidently disentangle each feature's direct and interactive effects. findings for the Clearinghouse institution (or call market) are that the last-mover and orderflow access privileges both are modestly profitable and neither impairs 3A companion paper, Friedman (1993) , examines the same data set. It compares asset market performance across the Clearinghouse and Double Auction trading institutions. The present paper focuses on the profitability and market impact of trading privileges within each institution. Portions of Section II and of Section III.A below are adapted from the companion paper and are included here to make the exposition more self-contained. The companion paper should be consulted for a literature survey. market performance. The main findings for the Double Auction institution (or con? tinuous market) are that quicker access to orderflow information is quite profitable and more detailed access is possibly profitable; both privileges seem to enhance market performance slightly. By contrast, privileged marketmaking is extremely profitable and greatly impairs market performance.
The final section offers a summary and a few interpretive remarks. Official instructions, including descriptions ofthe market institutions and reproductions of the trading screens, are collected in Appendix A.
II. Experimental Design

A. Basic Procedures
Each experiment reported here consists of a series of 12 or more trading pe? riods (sometimes called "Market Days"), each lasting at most five minutes. The market participants in each experiment, the "traders," are typically eight to 12 Uni? versity of California undergraduates who buy and sell asset units (called "shares") for cash, using various computerized trading mechanisms described below. At the end of the experiment, the traders are paid the profit they earn, ranging from $10 to $30 in a typical experiment. The stakes seem sufficient to strongly motivate the traders to seek strategies that will increase profit. Due to the market complexities, traders generally appear to require experience in one or two experiments before they become comfortable with their strategies. The data reported here exclude experiments using inexperienced traders.4
Asset units are valuable because each share pays a trader-specific liquidating dividend (the "payout") at the end ofa trading period. Differences in payout values provide traders with gains from trade5 in a risky environment. More specifically, in each experiment, there are two or three different trader types with each type consisting of three or more individual traders. The trader type with the highest 4Training procedures were as follows. Traders were recruited from large sophomore and juniorlevel economics classes at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Those who agreed to participate were given copies of the instructions and invited to attend a training experiment using the basic DA institution. Each training experiment began with a 10-15 minute oral review of the instructions, a question and answer period, and a short written quiz. Then three or four practice trading periods (no cash payments) were conducted on the computer system with questions permitted. When all traders were ready, a computerized 8-14 period experiment was conducted. A few individuals with unusually low profits and quiz scores were eliminated and the remaining (80-95 percent) participants were entered into the pool of trained traders, which typically numbered about 40 individuals. Except for a few lastminute replacements, the traders in reported experiments were all drawn from this pool of experienced traders. The data from training experiments have been saved but are not analyzed here because these experiments contain relatively few trading days, are usually dominated by beginner errors, and often contain computer bugs, since beta testing for new versions of the program often was conducted with inexperienced subjects. 5 Differing payouts are intended as counterparts of trading incentives for participants in contemporary asset markets such as differing tax brackets, differing nonmarketable assets held in portfolios, and differing risk preferenees. Traders begin each trading period with a new endowment, typically three shares and $20.00 cash. They earn trading profit by purchasing shares at prices below their own payout and by selling shares for prices above own payout. Hence, both traders earn trading profits when a trader with lower payout sells to a trader with higher payout at an intermediate transactions price. Traders accumulate profits from one trading period to the next, and take home the total earned for all periods in the experiment (or, in some cases, a preannounced fraction of accumulated trading profit, e.g., 50 cents on the dollar). In the basic CH, traders have the right to delete (or "pull") bids and asks during the clearing period, but are not allowed to enter off setting orders (e.g., a bid price lower than one's own ask price). These rules are summarized in the default treatment pull = 1. In the variant pull = 0, orders must be confirmed before they are recognized by the computer and they are "committed," i.e., they cannot be offset or pulled. In the variant pull = 2, orders are offsetable as well as pullable. The final variant, pull = 3, allows traders at a single keystroke to improve their offers (increase bids and decrease asks) to meet the market. The Arizona Stock Exchange (Wunsch auction) again features an improvement rule of this sort. 
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The upper step function is the best ask price, the lower step function is the best bid price, and stars indicate transaction prices. The horizontal dashed lines indicate the FRE price, the fundamental value of the asset. Vertical lines indicate news events The trader type and content (e.g., 3B for the trader type 3 receiving notification of the lower payout) are noted at the top of the line, and the asset allocation (e.g., 11, 11, and 5 shares held, respectively, by traders of types 1, 2, and 3 at the time of the news event) is noted at the bottom of the line. Additional bids at this price would have had negative marginal revenue and were not entered. The result of activity was a 39-cent profit increment, and a slight increase in market efficiency (misallocations unchanged at 1 share, deviation of price from equilibrium reduced from 15 cents to 13 cents.) The other privileged trader was of type 2 and evidently had no profitable extratime opportunity. A final statistical remark is in order. Trading periods (and subperiods) are not really independent observations. Traders' expectations from previous periods and subperiods create some interperiod dependence. In the present case, this will tend to bias test statistics toward zero, since interperiod dependence will tend to blur the effects of changing the rules or privileges. one-sided. Therefore, I will refer to a positive statistic in excess of 1.20 as possibly significant and one in excess of 2.00 as significant, since these correspond roughly to the 10-percent and 2-percent confidence levels, respectively, for the asymptotic distribution and the one-sided alternative hypothesis.
First-Round Results
The first 16 experiments listed in Table 2 were conducted and analyzed before the remaining experiments. The analysis suggested several conclusions. Among the Double Auction privileges, the posting (marketmaking) privilege clearly had the most dramatic impact. Traders with the privilege, on average, earned more than twice the profit of unprivileged traders. Market efficiency was impaired: RMSE and Spread also roughly doubled, and AIE increased and volume decreased, but not as significantly.
The other DA privileges had some detectable effects. Delaying orderflow information to unprivileged traders increased profit of privileged traders by about 25 percent, but had little impact on market performance. Universal access to full orderflow information surprisingly appeared to increase spread and RMSE, but privileged access was not tested in these experiments.
Clearinghouse privileges also produced some surprising results in the firstround experiments. Typically, extratime and book = 2 privileges were combined, which increased market efficiency as well as profitability. The apparent impacts of committed (pull = 0) and offsetable (pull = 2) offers by all traders both were minor.
The first set of experiments was designed to cover a lot of territory superficially (a 1989 working paper, available on request, provides a detailed discussion of design and results).
More reliable conclusions regarding the profitability and market impact of trading privileges required a new set of experiments designed for the purpose. These follow-up experiments are numbered 17 and above in Table 2. C.
Follow-Up Results
Based primarily on follow-up experiments, Tables 3 and 4 report, respec? tively, the excess profit and the market performance impact for the most important trading privileges. The first pair of rows in Table 3 9The null hypothesis is that market performance is unaffected by the presence of privileged traders, and the natural alternative hypothesis is that performance is impaired. Negative signs indicate the null hypothesis is rejected in the wrong direction, so the one-tailed significance levels do not apply. Table 2 ) was designed to compare market per? formance with and without the privilege. Consequently, the set of subperiods with the privilege was supplemented by the relevant first-round data (from experiments 8 and 9) and the comparison set was balanced using the relevant data from experiments 20 and 23. The choice was made a priori before running the test statistics and is conservative in the sense that the comparison set slightly oversamples the noisiest (3 traders x 3 clones SEQuential) environment. Hence, positive results (i.e., reduced market efficiency) would be quite significant, but the observed negative results are somewhat ambiguous. unprivileged. Orderflow access was profitable overall, but not significantly so in the crucial follow-up experiments. Surprisingly, detailed orderflow access and rapid access did not impair market performance, and indeed appear to increase market efficiency somewhat. Restricting marketmaking to a few privileged traders clearly impaired market performance, especially informational efficiency and depth. This paper is purely empirical, but a few interpretative remarks are in order.
The lack of adverse market impact for most privileges is probably the biggest surprise in the results. Perhaps something here is akin to the revenue equivalence results of static one-sided auctions. As Vickrey (1961) first showed, the expected price in a simple first-price sealed-bid auction is the same as in the second-price auc? tion because traders' optimal bidding strategies adjust to the institutional change. The result has been generalized considerably since then; see Bulow and Roberts (1989) for a recent exposition. In the complex continuous-time two-sided auctions studied here, traders' strategic adjustments may fully compensate for apparently adverse changes in the rules. That is, there may be no net effect on market effi? ciency even though there are distributional effects on trader profits. The most dramatic finding reported here is the exceptional profitability and exceptionally adverse market impact of restricted marketmaking privileges; in this case, strategic readjustment evidently does not suffice to restore market efficiency. It is interesting to note that since it first awarded sole posting privileges to "spe?
cialists" some 120 years ago, the NYSE has undertaken a series of reforms and rule changes that reduce the adverse impact. Current rules include the imposition of an "affirmative obligation" on specialists to smooth price movements, awarding priority to public limit orders (an indirect form of posting privileges for nonspecialist traders), awarding nonspecialists access to the limit order book, and various "tick rule" limitations on specialists' transactions (NYSE Guide (1988)). An in? terpretation is that the rule changes were necessary because strategic adjustments were insufficient. The design of current experiments was constrained by the need to build on previous laboratory studies. The current experiments relax the constraint on future experiments. Now it is possible to examine trading regulations in more detail, e.g., the effects of pairing privileges to obligations. It also is now possible to take a broader perspective on trading privileges, e.g., to compare a straight commissions regime to an efficient privileges regime, or to find the equilibrium price of freely purchased privileges. Another idea for future experiments is to vary market thickness, perhaps in a multimarket setting. The early history of the NYSE and some recent circumstantial evidence (Economist (July 6, 1991)) suggests that sole post? ing privileges may enhance efficiency in very thin markets. Laboratory research along these lines has the potential to improve our understanding of intermediation and marketmaking.
The results reported here are not in themselves an adequate basis for policy decisions, but they are practically important for two reasons. First, a conclusion established in laboratory markets (especially when consistent from first-round to follow-up experiments) should alter the presumption about the behavior of field markets (Grether and Plott (1984) ). For example, the presumption (at least for reasonably thick markets) now should be that restricted marketmaking privileges are more likely to impair market performance (and to enhance privileged traders' profits) than modestly delaying orderflow information to less privileged traders. Second, the results presented here and in the companion paper (Friedman (1993)) provide a basis for policy-oriented studies. Exchange officials and regulators now can conduct a less costly and more reliable laboratory of field experiments to assess specific reform proposals.
